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Is THERE A STEROIDS PROBLEM?
THE PROBLEMATIC CHARACTER OF THE
CASE FOR REGULATION
LEWIS KURLANTZICK*
With all the hullabaloo about Barry Bonds and the recent drug testing
agreement in Major League Baseball, isn't it time to take a serious look at
the issues involved in steroid use by athletes? In fact, the seemingly simple
question of the proper treatment of steroid use in professional athletics is
highly complicated. That complexity reflects a mix of controverted justifi-
cations, enforcement mechanisms that implicate privacy interests' and
B.A. Wesleyan University, 1965; LL.B. Harvard Law School, 1968. Lewis
Kurlantzick is the Zephaniah Swift Professor of Law at the University of Connecticut
School of Law, where he regularly teaches a seminar on "Sports and the Law."
While players' privacy interests are often quickly discounted, the concern, in fact, is a
substantial one. JUDITH WAGNER DECEW, IN PURSUIT OF PRIVACY: LAW, ETHICS, AND
THE RISE OF TECHNOLOGY 125 (1997). The technological and physical intrusiveness
into a person's body and biological functions in the procedures for collecting samples
is obvious. In the case of required urinalysis, the sample is generally produced "under
direct observation." Id. at 129. This procedure also involves the "physical and
psychological intrusion of urinating on demand." Id. Moreover, analysis of "urine
samples may reveal ...physiological facts about the party being tested"-infor-
mation with no relevance to the testing regime's objectives-that he may well not
want shared with others. Id. Exposures of this sort, in turn, "raise... privacy
questions concerning [the] acquisition, storage, use, and distribution of the
information." Id. In light of these privacy values, an apt question, one which receives
insufficient attention, is whether existing or proposed schemes are unnecessarily
intrusive. Id. at 130. In any case, respect for these values requires attention to
"precautions to protect privacy and minimize error." Id. at 142.
Tests can reveal information about conditions such as diabetes, epilepsy, heart
trouble, and manic depression. Id. at 129. Disclosure of such information not only can
be embarrassing, but can lead to discrimination, employment loss, and financial loss.
Id. at 130. Of course, even if there is no disclosure, the revelation to testing personnel
itself is problematic. Id. at 129-30. Similarly, in the case of those whose tests produce
false negatives, privacy with respect to "control over the information is paramount, as
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feature an inverse relationship between expense and reliability, and
historically untrustworthy national and international enforcement author-
2ities.
At the core of the debate, though, is the matter of rationale. What are
the justifications proffered for a ban on steroid use? Probably most com-
mon is the "unnatural" performance-enhancing quality of these substances.
This rationale, apparently simple, is, in fact, hardly free of difficulty. The
problem is that over time the ingestion by athletes of a large range of
supplements and "restorative" substances,3 the use of novel training
methods and diets, and, of course, advances in equipment have all
"enhanced" performance. A difficulty lies in articulating a convincing
distinction between these enhancers and steroids. If the claimed difference
is rooted in a notion of naturalness, we presently have no convincing
explanation of why some substances, including synthetic vitamins, are
considered "natural" and others, including naturally occurring hormones,
are considered "unnatural." This task of differentiation may be not only
difficult but also impossible, as the debates on this topic among
philosophers of sports suggest that composition of a satisfying distinction
between permissible and impermissible substances may be beyond our
powers of conception and articulation.4 There appears to be no moral
distinction between the various "natural" and "unnatural" assists to perfor-
mance. 5 And the absence of such a distinction underlines the ambiguity of
the implications for their reputation, employment, and freedom may be grave." Id. at
134. A testing regime, then, must include "detailed guidelines . . . to protect the
confidentiality of the information gained from tests." Id. at 143. In fact, there is an
interaction between privacy concerns and test accuracy, as inaccuracy heightens
threats to privacy. Id. at 130. Thus, it may make sense to insist on "more vigilance
and control over the information gathered from the tests and place more weight on
requiring privacy protection, when there is a high probability that the information is
mistaken." Id.
2. See PAUL WEILER & GARY ROBERTS, SPORTS AND THE LAW 1056-61, 1067, 1078-79
(3d ed. 2004) (highlighting the International Amateur Athletic Federation's failure to
follow its own drug testing guidelines and procedures in the case of Butch Reynolds,
an American track and field star, and Olympic judging scandals).
3. Indeed, the distinction between restorative and additive drugs is unclear. See Norman
Fost, Banning Drugs in Sports: A Skeptical View, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Aug. 1986,
at 5-6. See generally Thomas H. Murray, The Ethics of Drugs in Sport, in DRUGS &
PERFORMANCE IN SPORTS 11, 13 (Richard H. Strauss ed., 1987) (explaining that it is
difficult even to define clearly what we mean by "drug").
4. See, e.g., ROBERT SIMON, FAIR PLAY: THE ETHICS OF SPORT 72, 80 (2d ed. 2004) (not-
ing that no clear definition distinguishes the kind of performance-enhancing drugs
sports officials want to prohibit from the legitimate use of vitamins or allergy
medicine; the term "natural" too vague and open-textured to be of help in this area).
5. See, e.g., Fost, supra note 3, at 7.
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a moral evaluation of drug use and of the meaning of our cultural notion
that the "right" way to obtain success is through hard work.
A second justification for disapproval rests on a concern for the
athlete's health. Yet, assuming that accurate information is available and
therefore ignorance of any physical risk of steroid use is not present, this
rationale is problematic, at least for competent adults. Athletes are in a
position to make a decision about what behavior is in their best interest, to
weigh the risks and benefits according to their own values.6 And a
paternalistic rule that attempts to prevent the athlete from harming himself
runs counter to the important values of independence and personal choice.
Moreover, it is likely that the feared harm is neither life-threatening nor
irreversible. 8 Presumably, under this health rationale, if performance is
enhanced by substances that cause neither short-term nor long-term harm to
the athlete, these substances should not be banned.
A third justification, though more intricate and less often voiced, is
more promising. This justification is rooted in a concern for a form of
"coercion" in the athlete's decision-making and his inability to coordinate a
response without outside intervention. If one person is perceived to have an
advantage in using a drug, others may feel compelled to use it in an effort
to try to stay even. That use decision is not necessarily troubling, any more
than the initial decision to engage in a risky sport. After all, the athlete can
choose to forego the opportunity and any attendant risks. 9 However, if a
6. See generally M.D. Burke, Drugs in Sport: Have They Practiced Too Hard? A
Response to Schneider and Butcher, 24 J. PHIL. SPORT 47 (1997) (arguing that
organizational interference with liberty limits actions of athletes whose techniques,
tactics, or training methods test limits of what athletic community regards as
acceptable practice; historically, what at first appear to be violations of game's ethos
may eventually be viewed as brilliant innovations and become part of orthodoxy).
7. See Murray, supra note 3, at 17-18 (articulating a thoughtful, though ultimately
unpersuasive, argument that a ban on steroid use constitutes an act of justified
paternalism).
8. See generally THOMAS MORAWETZ, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 170-71 (1980)
(justifying paternalistic laws only to protect persons against considerable and
irreversible harm). Norman Fost has expressed doubt about the sincerity of this
justification in a universe where the risks of competing in the sport itself often far
exceed the risks of the drugs causing concern. See Fost, supra note 3, at 5-6. Thomas
Murray has justly noted that this criticism is flawed and that it is not disingenuous to
allow these on-field risks and yet deny athletes the opportunity to decide whether to
assume the risks posed by performance-enhancing drugs: "To say that because some
risks remain we have no business trying to minimize unnecessary additional risk is
like saying that because people get hurt in auto accidents there is no point in
providing safety equipment like seat belts or in requiring people to wear them."
Murray, supra note 3, at 16-17. Yet when one hears the frequent expression of moral
outrage about the use of steroids, Fost's observation resonates on some level.
9. The question here is whether placing athletes who prefer not to use steroids in a
20061
NEW ENGLAND LA W REVIEW
large percentage of participants in a particular sport would choose not to
use steroids if left to their own independent decisions, but feel pressured to
use them in order to remain competitive with users, a case can be made for
intervention in the form of a rule banning (or limiting) use. In light of the
large number of potential users, the costs of individuals contractually
establishing an advanced arrangement that would serve the collective
interest of assurance of non-use would be prohibitive. Thus, a rule here
could be seen as a response to a problem of coordination that the interested
parties cannot resolve themselves.' 0 Under this justification, the athletes'
situation can be seen as analogous to that of the fishermen who will
"overfish" and excessively deplete the stock in the absence of a legal rule
limiting the permitted catch. The coordination function, though, need not
be effected by public intervention." Indeed, in the case of all the major
position where they have to either abandon any realistic chance of experiencing their
sport's external rewards or endanger their long-term health by taking drugs is an
illegitimate imposition. Compare Nicholas Dixon, Rorty, Performance-Enhancing
Drugs, and Change in Sport, 28 J. PHIL. SPORT 78, 80-81 (2001), and SIMON, supra
note 4, at 77-79, with Fost, supra note 3, at 7 (imagine a pro football player who
argues that he is being coerced into risking knee injury; he is free to refuse the
opportunity and its risks with no loss of anything to which he is entitled). Catlin and
Murray's postulation-"[t]he athlete remains free to choose whether or not to violate
the rules of the sport as their [sic] competitors are doing, but is not free to pursue
his ... dream with confidence that the best athlete will win'--is conclusory, as the
very question up for debate is whether the rules should include a prohibition on drug
use. Don H. Catlin & Thomas H. Murray, Performance-Enhancing Drugs, Fair
Competition, and Olympic Sport, 276 J. AM. MED. Ass'N 231, 237 (1996). The
analytical risk in using "coercion" so broadly in this context is that it winds up
deprived of any moral force. See SIMON, supra note 4, at 75-76.
10. See generally Philip Heymann, The Problem of Coordination: Bargaining and Rules,
86 HARV. L. REV. 797 (1973).
11. There are several bills pending in Congress that dictate a testing and sanction regime
for the four major professional sports leagues in the United States. The proposed bills
have common emphasis and terms: they call for more sweeping drug testing
provisions, reference international standards, and require severe sanctions for
violators. See, e.g., Drug Free Sports Act of 2005, H.R. 1862, 109th Cong. The bills
raise a serious question of constitutional infirmity. The prime question is whether the
legislated program would violate the Fourth Amendment; more precisely, does it
dictate an unreasonable search? The detailed prescription of testing, sanctions, and
implementation would not be the product of private initiative. Rather, the leagues
would comply by compulsion of sovereign authority. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor
Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 614-16 (1989). Moreover, there is no doubt that the
collection and analysis of the samples required by the bills constitute searches of the
person and therefore are subject to the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 616-18. In
addition, there is no obvious compelling governmental interest served by the
legislation that would render the intrusion "reasonable." The testing program does
not serve the interest of protecting public safety, in contrast to a private employee's
[Vol. 40:789
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job where deficient performance because of drug use would present a risk of property
or personal damage to members of the public using the products or services of that
business. Additionally, there is no diminished expectation of privacy on the part of
employees due to pervasive regulation of the industry. In sum, a Fourth Amendment
challenge to the legislation would rest on firm grounds. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT VOL. 2, 445-51 (2d
ed. 1987).
The congressional bills stress the achievement of "uniformity." They dictate
uniform testing regimens and sanctions among all professional sports. While the
words "uniformity" and "harmony" always carry a positive charge, considered
evaluation of any legislative proposal requires us to avoid being seduced by terms
instinctively conveying positive values. Harmonization is not necessarily beneficial.
See generally ROBERT L. BARD & LEWIS KURLANTZICK, COPYRIGHT DURATION:
DURATION, TERM EXTENSION, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE MAKING OF COPYRIGHT
POLICY 191-201 (1998) (explaining that international harmonization of copyright
term of protection provides few benefits). Indeed, the bills' undiscriminating
directives reveal a lack of congressional knowledge about, and sensitivity to, the
differences between the operations of the various leagues. To take just one example:
uniformity of sanctions. A two-year suspension will produce significantly different
economic and career effects on players depending on the typical length of a career for
a particular sport and a particular position. Similarly, a sanction such as a ten-game
suspension will have markedly different financial impact in a sport such as football
with a sixteen game season than in baseball with a 162 game season. See generally
Hearing on H.R. 1862 Before the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 109th Cong. 3
(2005) (statement of Donald M. Fehr, Executive Director of Major League Baseball
Players Association, arguing differential treatment appropriate in light of differing
levels of culpability); "[d]ifferent sports have different sensitivities to the loss of a
player. In baseball. . . the impact is not severe, as even the best player on a team only
comes to bat four or five times in a typical game. In basketball ... the impact is far
graver." Robert L. Bard & Lewis Kurlantzick, Knicks-Heat and the Appropriateness
of Sanctions in Sport, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 507, 515-16 (2002).
In the end, an examination of drug testing underscores the interrelation of
ends and means. Analysis of the amenability of a given problem-here steroid use-
to certain approaches to resolution may serve to sharpen an understanding of the
problem itself. Given an apparent agreement in the abstract on the issue, the effort to
put the agreement into institutional form with attention to the costs, mechanics, and
efficacy of implementation, including identification of and respect for values
implicated and attention to who decides disputes, by what procedures, under what
standards, and with what consequences, may dictate a reshaping not only of the
means chosen but also of the ends themselves or an alteration in the expectations for
the scheme. If enforcement is ineffective or unfeasible, "the second-best option may
be to repeal the rule entirely, fully inform competitors of the risks of steroid use, and
let the athletes decide whether or not to take their chances." See JAMES A.R.
NAFZIGER, INTERNATIONAL SPORTS LAW 153 (2d ed. 2004) (noting that it is almost
impossible to detect blood-doping procedure in the absence of a self-confession);
PAUL C. WEILER, LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD: HOW THE LAW CAN MAKE SPORTS
BETTER FOR FANS 78 (2000). See generally PAUL A. FREUND, ON LAW AND JUSTICE
114-15 (1968).
2006]
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professional sports leagues a private mechanism, the players' union, exists
to effectuate the players' interests, and the union and management can
adopt a rule by contract.12 But, of course, even if this coordination
justification is theoretically persuasive, there remains the empirical ques-
tion of whether the assumption about participant attitudes is accurate. 13
A decision by owners and players to ban or limit the use of steroids
might proceed from a quite different perspective, that of entertainment.
That is, the parties are engaged in the joint sale of an entertainment product
and consequently the views of their consumers are of critical concern to
them. Hence, if present and potential fans are likely to change their
preferences with respect to consumption of the sport in the absence of
league action against steroid use, it would make sense simply as a matter of
sound commercial judgment to take action to avoid this customer aliena-
tion. League action would be rooted in a practical concern about the
financial implications of athletes with bad images.' 4 This rationale for
12. Caution in the design and implementation of a testing program-indeed, in the
construction of any disciplinary regime-is especially appropriate in the setting of
baseball, and other professional sports, where the employment effect of a
Commissioner's ruling, due to its industry-wide character, is more sweeping than an
act of management discipline in a more conventional industry. For example, imagine
an experienced Travelers Insurance Company employee who is well-paid but has
limited competence outside insurance. Fortunately for him, market forces tend to limit
the potential for abusive treatment by his employer and provide him with options if he
is maltreated. Employment opportunities at other insurance companies affect
Travelers' handling of the employee, and they offer comparable job possibilities if
Travelers dismisses him. This market constraint, though, does not operate in profes-
sional sports because a Commissioner suspension amounts to a ban on hiring by all
employers in the industry.
National and international federations in "amateur" sports perform a similar
gatekeeper function. Accordingly, their disciplinary decisions, correct or incorrect,
can cause severe consequences to the careers of athletes subject to their jurisdiction.
See, e.g., Reynolds v. Int'l Amateur Athletic Fed'n, 841 F. Supp. 1444, 1456 (S.D.
Ohio 1992). These athletes have the protection of neither the market nor of a union.
Such a collective decision by all members of an industry to exclude a person from
work in that business is necessarily troubling. Such behavior implicates not only the
values of market efficiency, expressed in the antitrust laws, and employee economic
liberty, but also a concern about concentration of power, the establishment of a kind
of private government with no constitutional constraints and no input from those who
are significantly affected by its decisions.
13. See generally Catlin & Murray, supra note 9, at 237 (arguing that staunchest
supporters of drug testing are the athletes in the Olympic movement). But cf SIMON,
supra note 4, at 81-82 (arguing that rational and impartial athletes voting behind
limited "veil of ignorance" would likely support a rule that steroid use should be
prohibited rather than permitted).
14. Whether drug use does, in fact, undermine faith in the integrity of competition is an
empirical question without much evidence.
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response, though, has nothing to do with concern for athletes' health,
preservation of an "even" playing field, or a distinction between "natural"
and "unnatural" substances. Rather the decision to condition employment
on abstention from use of steroids derives from a judgment about the
marketing of the product.
It is unlikely that any legal obstacle stands in the way of union
consent to a steroid ban. Such an agreement would not involve the
compromise of an unwaivable civil right of employees. Nor would a ban in
pursuit of fan demand constitute a response to customer prejudices
dictating discrimination on the basis of race or other suspect characteristics.
Of course, as noted, that agreement would be rooted in business concerns
and not in ethical considerations about the character of the athletic
enterprise.
There is good reason to question the prevailing view in the sports
community that performance-enhancing drugs are bad and that their use
should be banned. Cogent criticisms of the arguments for prohibiting
steroid use exist. Recognition of the incoherence of many of these claims
and, more generally, that the moral foundations of drug testing in sports are
suspect should inform decisions and beget caution about both establishment
of testing schemes and the design and implementation of such schemes.
Robert Simon has suggested that, assuming the lines of argument for and
against the view that steroid use is immoral are inconclusive, sports
authorities have reasonable grounds to impose a ban, and their decisions, if
reached pursuant to a proper process, have normative force.' 5 While this
perspective has some merit, its persuasiveness is weakened in the not-
uncommon situations where-unlike professional sports leagues-the
athletes have no representation in the policy-making process that
formulates (and executes) governing rules. The NCAA and the IOC are
examples of this kind of structure.
15. See SIMON, supra note 4, at 86-88, 90.
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